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digital identity management systems (DIMSs). Without a good understanding 
and identification of the most important parameters of DIMS based on the 
digital forensic investigation model, it is not possible to do digital forensic 
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paper is to identify and prioritise DIMS parameters by considering a user’s 
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1 Introduction 
The introduction of new IT and ICT technologies has helped online services and 
facilitated greater information sharing through the internet. This new cheaper and faster 
access has resulted in users’ access to online transactions and a wide range of online 
services. This new environment of communication comprising sharing information and 
business has created challenges and caused concerns about security and the legal aspects 
of digital environment. Identity information of people using the internet and sharing 
information, either intentionally or inadvertently, can be used by others or stolen by other 
parties. The advent of social networking sites, along with the near-ubiquitous availability 
and use of the World Wide Web has significantly changed the ways in which users 
communicate and share information (Jones and Martin, 2010). The increasing number of 
criminal reports and warnings about cybercrimes due to the illegal use of user identity 
and stolen information clearly explains the importance of security and privacy challenges 
for social networking sites and different internet applications (Perez, 2009; BBC News, 
22 July 2007). 
At the same time, new technologies support the increasing demand for access to 
information at any time or place. As a result, while determining the identity of a user on a 
network or a device is not so easy, the range of devices that must be examined and 
the storage capacity of these devices have continued to increase. Technological 
advancements have not only made it increasingly easy to gain access to information, but 
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they have also made the issue of identifying the user more difficult as the credentials that 
they have to use to ‘prove’ their identity have had to become more international, more 
electronically based, and as a result, more difficult to validate. Embedded chips that store 
digital identity information to protect digital information and make it harder to forge 
documents may be used in e-passport and e-voting (Jones and Martin, 2010). According 
to Mueller et al. (2006) the context of usage is an important parameter for users to select 
their identity type and its attributes. Therefore, the type of digital identity management 
systems (DIMS) and their characteristics to manage a user’s digital identity (DI) lifecycle 
are strongly related to the context of usage, applications and online services. 
1.1 Digital identity 
An entity should be described as a set of characteristics and attributes forming a 
domain-based identity. There are differences between the defined identity of an entity in 
a social network and that on e-commerce applications. Most popular examples of 
identifiers are as follows: username/password, individual biometric information, digital 
signature and certificates, which are used in specific domains or contexts (Wayman, 
2008). Hence, DI is defined as the identity resulting from the digital codification of 
characteristics and attributes in a way that is suitable for processing by computer 
systems (El Maliki and Seigneur, 2007) digital identity refers to the aspect of digital 
technology that is concerned with the mediation of people’s experience of their own 
identity and the identity of other people and things (Cameron, 2005). National 
identification number and passport number, which are social identifiers, biometric 
information such as fingerprints and other information including email address, date of 
birth, etc. constitute identifiable information for an individual. 
The process to uniquely identify individuals according to their attributes and 
characteristics as entities in a specific context is called identity management (Leskinen, 
2012). 
1.2 Digital identity management systems 
Identity management through computer networks is commonly described as the 
combination of technologies and practices for representing and recognising entities as 
digital identities (El Maliki and Seigneur, 2007). DIMS is defined as identity 
management (IdM) is the framework used in computer or communication systems to 
control identity (Dabrowski and Pacyna, 2008) or DIMS is the resource access control 
and identity information management implemented with new technology, the goal of IdM 
is to cut off the cost to manage users and their identities, attributes and access privilege 
to improve productivity and security (Cao and Yang, 2010). 
Every DIMS consists of components that can be called a user, who wants to have 
access to a service, identity provider (IdP), which is the issuer of user identity. Service 
provider (SP) is the relay party imposing identity check, which is a set of attributes of the 
user (Banihashemi et al., 2016; Spantzel et al., 2006). 
In the past users usually had one identity, but in current internet usages and online 
services it is acceptable for a user to have more than one DI for different online 
interactions. Due to the user’s entitlement change over time, it is necessary to change its 
permission and access control of her/his identities and handle them in a centralised way 
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(Windley, 2005; El Maliki and Seigneur, 2007). This is known as DI lifecycle which 
comprises four steps: 
1 enrolment 
2 management 
3 support 
4 deletion at the end of the lifecycle (Table 1)  
(Windley, 2005; Hansen and Meints, 2006). 
Within an organisation DI lifecycle is a three-step process involving initial identity 
set-up, identity maintenance and identity termination (Mueller et al., 2006). 
Table 1 Steps of the identity lifecycle 
• Enrolment – creation of accounts for new employees: 
Initial issuance of the credentials and setting of the access permissions needed by the new 
employee. 
• Management – maintenance of accounts: 
In a changing working environment (promotions, changes of departments) the ‘user and 
access management’ needs to handle the changing access permissions for the enrolled users 
(in order to minimise liabilities). 
• Support – changing of authorisations: 
Issuance and re-issuance of credentials (e.g. reset password). 
• Deletion – end of lifecycle: 
Revoke or freeze user-accounts or entitlements. 
Source: Based on Windley (2005), Hansen and Meints (2006) and 
Mezler-Andelberg (2008) 
Every DIMS should be elaborated to deal with the following core aspects (ICPP and 
SNG, 2003; Banihashemi et al., 2016): 
• Management: the number of digital identities per person will increase, so users need 
convenient support to manage these identities and the corresponding authentication. 
Managing digital identities does not only mean handling new and fixed identities 
within one scope, but also handling the complex situations of changing identities in 
changing scopes, and managing the different perceptions of identity within the same 
scope (Alpár et al., 2011). 
• Reachability: the management of reachability allows users to handle their contacts in 
order to prevent misuse of their address (spam) or unsolicited phone calls. By using 
DIMS, one implicitly agrees to several complex and poorly understood trust 
relationships between the parties that belong to that identity management system. 
The user trusts the IdP not to act on its behalf without his/her explicit consent. In 
many systems for identity management, the IdP essentially does the logging in to the 
SP, on behalf of a user. It can easily do so, without the user even being present. 
Clearly, the user does not want the IdP to do this. Additionally, the user expects the 
IdP not to release personal information unless explicitly asked by the SP and with the 
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permission of the user The relying party trusts the IdP not to extend the circle of trust 
(without his/her consent) (Alpár et al., 2011). 
• Authenticity: ensuring authenticity with authentication, integrity and non-repudiation 
mechanisms can prevent identity theft. To prevent phishing attacks it is very 
important that users are able to authenticate the SP and the IdP. Mutual 
authentication, therefore, needs to be incorporated in identity management systems, 
in such a way that the user is not required to install special software or to use one and 
the same computer all the time (Alpár et al., 2011). 
• Anonymity and pseudonymity: providing anonymity prevents tracking or identifying 
the users of a service. To enhance user privacy, it is recommended that users can 
remain anonymous or use pseudonyms at SPs, and to have IdPs that do not link all 
user transactions at all SPs together. Although identity management systems already 
implement some of these solutions, not all of these have been put to use. Identity 
management system are required not to allow IdPs to see all user transactions, 
without violating the law of location independence (which states that identity 
management systems should not rely on any persistent data stored locally on the 
user’s machine) (Alpár et al., 2011). 
• Organisation of personal data management: a quick method to create, modify or 
delete work accounts has considerable significance, especially in big organisations. 
Identity management systems should provide a way to automatically determine the 
full set of required credentials for a certain service and the minimal role the user  
can assume that covers those credentials, and they should also put the user back  
into control and support the user in maintaining a user profile that can be used  
(in a controlled manner) by businesses in several organisational domains  
(Alpár et al., 2011). 
1.3 DIMS digital forensics 
Digital forensics deals with the investigation of computers and other digital devices that 
are believed to have been used in criminal activities (Francia and Clinton, 2005). DIMS 
digital forensics involves the application of methodologies and tools to capture and 
analyse DI transactions in DIMS that can be presented as evidence in a court of law 
(Jones and Martin, 2010). “A digital forensic process is a procedure that is followed to 
investigate a particular criminal activity involving digital evidence” (Casey, 2001). 
Digital forensic investigation (DFI) is a three-step process involving the following: 
acquiring the evidence while ensuring that integrity is preserved; authenticating the 
validity of the extracted data, which involves ensuring that it is as valid as the original; 
and analysing the data while keeping its integrity. 
The security properties of DIMS the capabilities and characteristics that are helpful 
for protecting and collecting digital evidence for personally identifiable information by 
considering its related DFI challenges are critical factor to the success of an identity 
management service. Therefore, one of the most important evaluation factors of DIMS is 
its capabilities for DFI, facilitating collection and storage of DIs and transactions in DI 
lifecycle as digital evidence, which prevents violation of a DIMS’s core features and 
minimises its side effects. 
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Providing proper evidence in order to prove who is responsible for a crime is one of 
the challenges for DIMSs today. Therefore, a DIMS should provide an easy way to the 
internal or external auditor for assessing the security and DFI capabilities and for 
collecting DF by considering digital identity lifecycle and contexts of usage challenges in 
digital forensic investigation model (DFIM). 
So any evaluation of DI parameters as DF in the DFI process should be done by 
considering DI lifecycle and the context of usage or type of online services. 
Computer fraud and crime are growing day by day, but unfortunately less than two 
percent of reported cases result in confidence. DFI emerged in response to the escalation 
of crimes committed using computer systems and digital environment (i.e. the internet 
and online services) either as an object of crime, an instrument used to commit a crime or 
a repository of evidence related to a crime (Agarwal et al., 2011). A DFI is the process to 
determine and relate extracted information and digital evidence to establish factual 
information for judicial review (Ieong, 2006). Ieong (2006) and Köhn et al. (2008) 
emphasise the need to establish factual information as the outcome of such investigation. 
As discussed earlier in this paper, one of the most important challenges for DFI is to find 
the actual perpetrator of a crime or fraud in digital environment (Agarwal et al., 2011). 
Thus, to successfully find DI information related to the actual perpetrator of a crime, 
using DIMS, which has developed with proper capabilities by considering DFI 
requirements, regulations and priorities, is a necessity. Identifying and prioritising DI 
lifecycle parameters by considering contexts of usage of DIMS will help us to develop a 
DFI-ready DIMS. 
DFIM attempts to address some of the shortcomings of previous methodologies, and 
provides the following advantages: a consistent, standardised and systematic framework 
for digital forensic investigation process; a framework that works systematically in a 
team according to captured evidence; a mechanism for applying the framework according 
to a country’s digital forensic investigation technologies; and a generalised methodology 
that judicial members can use to relate technology to non-technical observers (Agarwal 
et al., 2011). There are various process models to describe the steps and processes to 
follow during digital forensic investigations. During such investigations, it is not only the 
digital evidence itself that needs to prevail in a court of law; the process followed and 
terminology used should also be rigorous and generally accepted within the digital 
forensic community (Kohn et al., 2013). In this article, integrated DFIM (Kohn et al., 
2013) is assumed as a DFIM having a four-step model in order to identify and prioritise 
DI lifecycle parameters by considering contexts of usage for DFIs. The four steps of the 
model are as follows: the readiness phase (the goal of this phase is to ensure that the 
operations and infrastructure are able to fully support an investigation), the deployment 
phase (the purpose is to provide a mechanism for an incident to be detected and 
confirmed), the physical crime investigation phase (the goal of this is to collect and 
analyse the physical evidence and reconstruct the actions that took place during the 
incident), and digital crime scene investigation phase (the goal is to collect and analyse 
the digital evidence obtained from the physical investigation phase and through any other 
future means). 
1.4 Forensically ready DIMS 
The purpose of digital forensic readiness is to reduce the effort involved in performing an 
investigation while maintaining the level of credibility of the digital evidence being 
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collected (Ngobeni et al., 2010; Endicott-Popovsky et al., 2007). The decrease in effort 
includes reductions in the time and the cost of incident response. 
Minimising the cost of the DFI process as well as maximising the usefulness of 
collected DF is the goal of any successful DFI process (Tan, 2001). A digital  
system that is capable of minimising the cost of collecting digital evidence and 
maximising the usefulness of collected digital evidence during DFI is called DF ready 
system. DFI in DIMS that is ‘forensically ready’ can be done rapidly and efficiently. In 
general, reducing the time involved in collecting digital evidence reduces the cost of the 
investigation. 
Ngobeni et al. (2010) discuss evidence preservation and time to execute, which are 
affected by technical and nontechnical factors including the following: 
• How logging is done, the strength of the evidence collected will improve as findings 
are ‘validated’ by multiple data points. 
• What is logged: what is not logged is lost. Every application on every system or 
device on your network represents a logging opportunity. 
• Intrusion detection system (IDS): once the argument was whether host IDS (HIDS) 
or network IDS (NIDS) was better. Today, as evidenced by the merging of HIDS and 
NIDS in the market place, a mixed solution is necessary. This is complimentary to 
the forensics-oriented desire for multi-tiered and centralised logging. 
• Forensic acquisition: forensic acquisition should follow intrusion detection in a 
timely manner. As such, much of the forensic readiness effort should be put to 
deciding how evidence will be acquired from any computer or other device used on 
the network. 
• Evidence handling: evidence handling represents the ‘rest of the equation’ after 
evidence has been acquired. This includes chain of custody, network transport, 
physical transport, physical storage, and examination. 
As discussed earlier, the importance of the DI lifecycle in DIMSs, along with their 
context of usage and their important roles in DFI, has led IT specialists to use the 
following criteria for identifying and prioritising the DI lifecycle and the context of usage 
parameters to develop DIMS which is most suited for DFI readiness. 
• User-centric identity paradigm: user-centric approach to identity management is a 
promising way to improve user experience, and thereby the security of online 
services (i.e. online banking) as a whole. This has the potential to stimulate increased 
uptake of online services (El Maliki and Seigneur, 2007; Spantzel et al., 2006). 
However, selecting the parameters that improve user experience may bring some 
constraints for using DIMS with capabilities of collecting and storing DI information 
as DF in DFI. For example, when using DIMS in DFI to collect digital evidence, 
parameters that provide SP (relying party) and IdP the ability to control user 
experiences and transactions in DIMS will be helpful to monitor and preserve the 
conditions for collecting DI information and using them in DFI. 
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• User’s security and privacy: since identity information is often private and 
confidential, it is important that suitable privacy and security techniques be adopted 
for its protection (Bertino et al., 2009) in the context of usage and type of 
application. It seems DIMS with more restriction on a user’s security and privacy 
would be helpful for DFI, but usually these parameters put more restrictions on DF 
collection and moving towards forensically ready DIMS. 
• User’s legal perspective: it deals with user control over his/her identity information 
and defines the disclosure policies of his/her identity information to other parties 
(Barisch et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2009). A DIMS that is concerned with user’s legal 
perspective can be suitable and helpful for DFI. Consider the following scenario in 
case of ‘least information disclosure’, which means not only the smallest number of 
claims but also the least likely information to identify a given individual across 
multiple contexts. For example, if a scenario requires proof of being a certain age, 
then it is better to acquire and store the age category rather than the date of birth. 
Date of birth, along with other claims, is more likely to uniquely identify a subject 
and therefore represents ‘more identifying information’ that should be avoided if it is 
not needed (Cameron, 2005). Therefore, as discussed in this scenario, the ‘least 
information disclosure’ parameter in DIMS will introduce more constraints in DFI 
and the confined range and variety of information collected for DI as DFI. 
• Types of DIMS: depending on the types of DIMS (isolated, centralised, federated or 
anonymously federated), DI parameters and their evaluation metrics differ 
(Leskinen, 2012). Federated identity management offers the possibility of providing 
a familiar and consistent user interface for users with respect to login, account sign-
up, and identity management activities on the web (http://www.network-
forensic.net/form2/PID02-04). Federated identity management is a set-up where 
identity is shared across domains (Maler and Reed, 2008). It has security 
considerations that involve multiple security domains, weak user authentication in 
the web identity chain, and privacy issues as sharing personally identifiable 
information is often a key goal. It seems that due to the challenges of the federated 
identity management architecture, proposing a simplified (not only single) sign-on 
would be useful to collect and store DI information for DFI. 
• Types of application (context of usage): social network communities facilitate the 
sharing of identity information in a directed network. Compared to traditional 
methods of identity information disclosure, such as a campus directory, the social 
network community fosters a more subjective and holistic disclosure of identity 
information (Bonneau et al., 2012). Different SPs require different DIs. Different 
types of DIMSs are used by different types of online services and computer 
applications (i.e. the website of a bank). Therefore, using DIMS with preserved 
capabilities for DFI by considering context of usage and application is an important 
criterion to evaluate DI lifecycle parameters as DF in forensically ready DIMSs. 
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In order to succeed, identity management solutions must consider identity rules by 
considering the above-mentioned criteria along with minimising the cost of DFI process. 
The aim of this paper is to identify and prioritise DI parameters by considering their role 
as digital evidence in forensically ready DIMSs. 
To identify and prioritised DI lifecycle parameters and DI parameters in the context 
of usage of a DIMS by considering the DI role as DF in forensically ready DIMS, this 
paper has used empirical experiences of digital forensic investigators and IT and ICT 
experts. 
Hence, in the first step, this paper tried to propose a list of DI lifecycle parameters in 
a sample federated DIMS [i.e. a DIMS being used in a hospital information system (IS)] 
by considering DI role as DF, then prioritised the above-mentioned parameters for DI 
lifecycle based on AHP evaluation method. In the second step, the paper proposed a list  
of DI parameters in a DIMS by considering their role as DF in the context of usage 
and tried to prioritise these parameters based on analytic hierarchical process (AHP) 
evaluation method. 
The AHP is a theory of measurement through pairwise comparisons and relies on the 
judgements of experts to derive priority scales. These scales measure intangibles in 
relative terms. The comparisons are made using a scale of absolute judgements that 
represents, how one element influences another with respect to a given attribute. The 
judgements may be inconsistent, and how to measure inconsistency and improve the 
judgements when it is possible to obtain better consistency is a concern of the AHP 
(http://www.network-forensic.net/form/PID01-09). 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review. Section 3 
discusses the DI lifecycle parameters in DFI and introduces a new set of evaluation and 
design criteria and the materials used to create these parameters. Section 4 discusses the 
DIMS parameters to collect DI as DF by considering contexts of usage and introduces a 
new set of evaluation and design criteria and the materials used to create these 
parameters. In Section 5 the proposed parameters in two mentioned categories 
(DI lifecycle and contexts of usage) are tested and evaluated using the AHP method. 
Section 6 tries to introduce a summary table of the most important DI lifecycle and 
context of usage parameters of DIMS, and prioritise them by considering their role in 
forensically ready DIMSs. This list of prioritised DIMS parameters will help future 
research and studies in the field of digital and network forensic investigation, leading to 
the development of forensically ready DIMSs by considering the security and privacy 
challenges. 
2 Literature review 
In order to prepare and introduce a set of important DI parameters for forensically ready 
DIMSs, above-mentioned core facets of evaluation criteria should be considered. 
Moreover, the DI lifecycle as well as context of usage parameters for those criteria that 
have important roles in DFI needs to be collected and reviewed. Identity rules as stated 
by Cameron (2005) can be summarised as Table 2. 
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Table 2 Identity rules 
Study Parameters, definitions 
User control and consent, technical identity systems must only reveal 
information identifying a user with the user’s consent. 
Minimal disclosure for a constrained use, the solution that discloses the least 
amount of identifying information and best limits its use is the most stable 
long-term solution. 
Justifiable parties, digital identity systems must be designed so the 
disclosure of identifying information is limited to parties having a necessary 
and justifiable place in a given identity relationship. 
Directed identity, a universal identity system must support both ‘omni-
directional’ identifiers for use by public entities and ‘unidirectional’ 
identifiers for use by private entities, thus facilitating discovery while 
preventing unnecessary release of correlation handles. 
Cameron (2005) 
Pluralism of operators and technologies, a universal identity system must 
channel and enable the inter-working of multiple identity technologies run 
by multiple identity providers. 
Human integration, the universal identity metasystem must define the 
human user to be a component of the distributed system integrated through 
unambiguous human-machine communication mechanisms offering 
protection against identity attacks. 
Consistent experience across contexts, the unifying identity metasystem 
must guarantee its users a simple, consistent experience while enabling 
separation of contexts through multiple operators and technologies. 
Source: Cameron (2005) 
Obviously, a user’s security and privacy parameters for DI lifecycle play important roles 
in DIMS to give assurance of safety and make them successful. For digital technology 
and internet usage to fully deploy their potential, it is crucial that strong protection of 
digital identity be achieved. El Maliki and Seigneur (2007) summarises user-centric 
digital identity parameters as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 Identity user-centric parameters 
Study Parameters, definitions 
El Maliki and 
Seigneur (2007) 
Empowering the total control of users over their privacy. 
Usability, since users use the same identity for each identity transaction. 
Giving a consistent user’s experience thanks to uniformity of identity 
interface. 
Limiting identity attacks, (i.e. phishing) 
Limiting reachability/disturbances, spam reduction 
Reviewing policies on sides if required, identity providers and service 
provider’s websites. 
Huge scalability advantages, since the identity provider does not have to get 
any prior knowledge about the service provider. 
Assuring secure conditions when exchanging data 
Decoupling digital identity from applications 
Pluralism of operators and technologies 
Source: El Maliki and Seigneur (2007) 
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DIMSs must ensure that such information is not misused and the individual’s privacy is 
guaranteed (Bertino et al., 2009). In the DFI process, a user’s security and privacy 
parameters in the DI lifecycle involve the capabilities and characteristics of DIMS that 
help in DFI and collect digital evidence. Dhamija and Dusseault (2008) summarise some 
of the security and privacy parameters as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 Identity security and privacy parameters 
Study Parameters, definitions 
Dhamija and 
Dusseault 
(2008) 
Identity management is not a goal itself, identity management is rarely a 
user’s primary goal. Users are focused on their primary tasks, and identity 
management systems should aim to facilitate those tasks seamlessly, 
securely, and privately. 
Cognitive scalability is as important as technical scalability, identity 
management scheme designers must be cautious about reducing one user’s 
burden while simultaneously increasing users’ total workload or mental 
overhead. 
Users follow the path of least resistance, for identity management systems 
to succeed, users must find them easy to configure and use correctly and 
securely. It is also important to integrate identity management into the 
operating system or browser, so that users do not need additional software or 
incur additional costs. 
User consent could lead to maximum information disclosures, asking users 
to consent to more transactions would not result in greater control of 
information disclosures in identity management systems. By asking them to 
manage more identity information and presenting them with more choices, 
we only overwhelm them. The end result could be a system that increases, 
rather than minimises, the identity data that users are willing to reveal to 
third parties. 
We need mutual authentication (not just user authentication), to ensure that 
users are not providing their passwords to a phishing site, they must be able 
to authenticate the SP web site to ensure that it can be trusted to redirect to 
the correct IdP, and they should also authenticate the IdP’s website. 
SPs want to control the customer experience, many websites wish to control 
their own user accounts to monitor usage, prevent abuse of their services, 
and protect information about their customers. Designers must understand 
that the SP’s motivations are distinct from that of users. So to be widely 
adopted identity management systems must cater to both. 
Trust must be earned (and is hard for users to evaluate), no organisation can 
ensure a completely trusted system, and any bad or careless actor can tarnish 
the reputation of many. Thus, the identity community as a whole has a 
responsibility to behave securely and call attention to practices that threaten 
privacy or are unsafe. 
Source: Dhamija and Dusseault (2008) 
Moreover, by considering different types of identity usage in secure banking transactions 
as stated in Barisch et al. (2010), privacy and security parameters for the DI lifecycle can 
be as listed in Table 5. 
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Table 5 Identity security and privacy parameters 
Study Parameters, definitions 
Overcome identity fragmentation, user’s digital identity is fragmented. Thus 
user attributes are distributed across various accounts with different SP. The 
users have to be supported to manage this highly distributed information by 
means of a unified view across systems and providers. 
Barisch et al. 
(2010) 
Cross-Layer IdM, most IdM solutions target SSO for application layer 
services, neglecting the network layer with inconvenient and even dangerous 
consequences. In order to achieve cross-layer IdM, network authentication 
must be compatible with application layer authentication. That means we 
need an IdM solution that takes application layer as well as network layer 
into account. 
Improved privacy features, privacy preservation is one of the most important 
properties of IdM for user acceptability. The considerations of current 
research on privacy enhancing technologies need to take network properties 
into account, because network identifiers can be used for correlation. 
Support for multiple devices, current IdM solutions do not take into account 
that an end user owns more than one device and uses these devices to 
consume services. By providing an integrated view across all end user 
devices, taking into account the diversity of devices as well as of identities, 
the usability and security of IdM can be further increased. 
No dependency on online components, many IdM solutions depend on 
components like identity or attribute providers in order to work. That means 
these systems need 100% availability, which is difficult to guarantee. 
Moreover, if a user has no network connectivity, the system should still 
work for limited period of time. Therefore, solutions are needed that work 
temporarily without dependencies on online components. 
Backward compatibility, it is not reasonable to build new IdM solutions that 
do not interwork with already existing solutions. Therefore, new IdM 
solutions have to be either compatible with already existing systems or have 
to provide opportunities to interwork with those legacy systems. 
Source: Barisch et al. (2010) 
Many countries and international organisations (such as the European Union) have 
technical frameworks to enable users and citizens to have control over their identity and 
the identity information disclosure (Camenisch et al., 2005). DI lifecycle parameters to 
provide such legal framework for user’s control over his/her identity information can be 
considered in Table 6. 
Table 6 Digital identity legal framework parameters 
Study Parameters, definitions 
Camenisch et al. 
(2005) 
User informed consent and control, the user keeps control over which 
personal data are given to whom and for which purpose and maintains a 
complete and coherent view of the privacy policy of all their transaction 
partners. 
Privacy negotiation, when a user discloses personal data, the user can 
express a privacy policy which states how her personal data should be 
handled. Data minimisation – transaction partners only collect personal data 
that are necessary to perform their part of the transaction. 
Source: Camenisch et al. (2005) 
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Table 6 Digital identity legal framework parameters (continued) 
Study Parameters, definitions 
Camenisch et al. 
(2005) 
Identity management, a user may also wish to release different amounts of 
personal information depending on the trustworthiness of the transaction 
partner. 
Spectrum of anonymity, at one end of the spectrum, the parties agree to 
proceed without the need for any identifying data and the relationship can 
stay anonymous. At the other end of the spectrum, in medium-to-high risk 
transactions and law-related transactions, a third-party-issued identity proof 
such as an identity card, or a witness like a notary might be necessary. 
Accountability, let us reiterate that properly-designed anonymous 
transactions can also provide accountability – in other words, a user can be 
made accountable for misuse of the system or cheating, even though 
transactions are ‘anonymous’. 
Source: Camenisch et al. (2005) 
Moreover, Bonneau et al. (2012) define 25 properties for DI lifecycle evaluation in web 
services in three categories, namely usability, deployability, and security: 
Table 7 Digital identity web services parameters 
Study Parameters, definitions 
Bonneau et al. 
(2012) 
Usability parameters: 
• Memory wise-effortless, users of the scheme do not have to remember 
any secrets at all. 
• Scalable-for-users, using the scheme for hundreds of accounts does not 
increase the burden on the user. 
• Nothing-to-carry, users do not need to carry an additional physical object 
(electronic device, mechanical key, piece of paper) to use the scheme. 
• Physically-effortless, the authentication process does not require physical 
(as opposed to cognitive) user effort beyond, say, pressing a button. 
• Easy-to-learn, users who do not know the scheme can figure it out and 
learn it without too much trouble, and then easily recall how to use it. 
• Efficient-to-use, the time the user must spend for each authentication is 
acceptably short. 
• Infrequent-errors, the task that users must perform to log in usually 
succeeds when performed by a legitimate and honest user. 
• Easy-recovery-from-loss, a user can conveniently regain the ability to 
authenticate if the token is lost or the credentials forgotten. 
Deploy ability parameters: 
• Accessible, users who can use passwords are not prevented from using 
the scheme by disabilities or other physical (not cognitive) conditions. 
• Negligible-cost-per-user, the total cost per user of the scheme, adding up 
the costs at both the prover’s end (any devices required) and the verifier’s 
end (any share of the equipment and software required), is negligible. 
Source: Bonneau et al. (2012) 
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Table 7 Digital identity web services parameters (continued) 
Study Parameters, definitions 
Bonneau et al. 
(2012) 
• Server-compatible, at the verifier’s end, the scheme is compatible with 
text-based passwords. 
• Browser-compatible, users do not have to change their client to support 
the scheme and can expect the scheme to work when using other 
machines with an up-to-date, standards-compliant web browser and no 
additional software. 
• Mature, the scheme has been implemented and deployed on a large scale 
for actual authentication purposes beyond research. 
• Non-proprietary, anyone can implement or use the scheme for any 
purpose without having to pay royalties to anyone else. 
Security parameters: 
• Resilient-to-physical-observation, an attacker cannot impersonate a user 
after observing them authenticate one or more times. 
• Resilient-to-targeted-impersonation, it is not possible for an acquaintance 
(or skilled investigator) to impersonate a specific user by exploiting 
knowledge of personal details (birth date, names of relatives etc.). 
• Resilient-to-throttled-guessing, an attacker whose rate of guessing is 
constrained by the verifier cannot successfully guess the secrets of a 
significant fraction of users. 
• Resilient-to-unthrottled-guessing, an attacker whose rate of guessing is 
constrained only by available computing resources cannot successfully 
guess the secrets of a significant fraction of users. 
• Resilient-to-internal-observation, an attacker cannot impersonate a user 
by intercepting the user’s input from inside the user’s device (e.g., by key 
logging malware) or eavesdropping on the clear text communication 
between prover and verifier [we assume that the attacker can also defeat 
TLS if it is used, perhaps through the certificate authority (CA)]. 
• Resilient-to-leaks-from-other-verifiers, nothing that a verifier could 
possibly leak can help an attacker impersonate the user to another 
verifier. 
• Resilient-to-phishing, an attacker who simulates a valid verifier 
(including by DNS manipulation) cannot collect credentials that can later 
be used to impersonate the user to the actual verifier. 
• Resilient-to-theft, if the scheme uses a physical object for authentication, 
the object cannot be used for authentication by another person who gains 
possession of it. 
• No-trusted-third-party, the scheme does not rely on a trusted third party 
(other than the prover and the verifier) who could, upon being attacked or 
otherwise becoming untrustworthy, compromise the prover’s security or 
privacy. 
• Requiring-explicit-consent, the authentication process cannot be started 
without the explicit consent of the user. 
• Un-linkable, colluding verifiers cannot determine, from the authenticator 
alone, whether the same user is authenticating to both. 
Source: Bonneau et al. (2012) 
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By considering organisational information processes along with the client’s roles and 
responsibilities in an organisational chart, identity parameters should be considered and 
listed for future evaluation. Based on the IdM expertise point of view, Hall and Liedtka 
(2007) and GenericIAM (2007) summarised the following parameters as evaluation 
parameters for DI lifecycle for IdM in an organisation (Table 8). 
Table 8 Most prevalent factors for implementing IdM in organisations 
1 Risk management/IT security goal 
• Minimise liabilities 
• Mitigate risks 
• Make systems more secure 
2 Value creation goals 
• Efficiency goals (e.g. process optimisations) 
• Lower overall costs 
3 Compliance goals 
• Comply with relevant laws and regulations [e.g. Basel II or Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)] 
Source: Based on Hall and Liedtka (2007) and GenericIAM (2007) 
This paper sought to survey and review related articles and literature on the DI lifecycle 
and context of usage by considering its role as DF, and discussion about the importance 
of DI as DF (Leskinen, 2012) has tried to evaluate DIMS parameters by considering its 
functioning in different usage contexts. Other articles dealing with DF have tried to 
introduce DFIM and its trend to propose an integrated model (Kohn et al., 2013) to 
collect digital evidence and analyse them. It seems there is no such approach and 
classification regarding DI lifecycle parameters in DIMS that consider its role and affect 
each components of the digital investigation process. 
You can find below summary list of DI lifecycle and context of usage parameters in 
forensically ready DIMS which have been proposed in reviewed studies (Table 9). 
Table 9 Comparison of DI parameters studies for forensically ready DIMS 
Criterions 
Study 
1 2 3 4 5 
Cameron (2005) - 9 - 9 9 
El Maliki and Seigneur (2007) 9 9 - 9 - 
Dhamija and Dusseault (2008) 9 9 9 - - 
Barisch et al. (2010) - 9 - 9 - 
Camenisch et al. (2005) - 9 - 9 - 
Bonneau et al. (2012) - 9 9 - 9 
Hall and Liedtka (2007) and 
GenericIAM (2007) 
- 9 9 - - 
Notes: Criterions: 1 – user-centric identity paradigm; 2 – user’s security and privacy; 
3 – user’s legal perspective; 4 – types of DIMSs; 5 – type of application  
(context of usage) 
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According to the related literature and research papers that compare forensically ready 
DIMS criteria, it becomes apparent that there is no previous study that evaluates and 
prioritises DI life cycle and the context of usage parameters. 
3 Classifying DI lifecycle parameters 
The following parameters and evaluation criteria of DIMS are presented based on the 
parameters discussed in the literature review, while also taking into account the DI 
lifecycle application in DFI. 
As explained in Section 1 of present paper, it is important to evaluate and prioritise 
DI lifecycle parameters by considering its role as important digital evidence in DFI, so a 
priority list of DI lifecycle parameters in DIMS that affect the DFI process will be 
provided. 
According to DFIM phases and also considering our goal to develop and use a 
forensically ready DIMS, those DI lifecycle parameters that help us collect maximum DI 
information as digital evidence with minimum DFI costs in each of the four DFIM phases 
should be considered. For example, in the first phase of integrated DFIM, it seems DI 
lifecycle parameters that provide more and optimised control over DI information 
transactions and help us keep proper logging of DI information in DIMS (i.e. time stamp, 
mutual authentication protocols) should appear at the top of our evaluation list. 
This paper initially tried to categorise and list the most important DI lifecycle 
parameters in DIMS by reviewing them based on experts’ views. It also shed light on DI 
information as digital evidence in DFI in the investigation into present-day computer and 
internet-related crimes. In the next phase, a basic list of DI lifecycle parameters based on 
the results of the evaluation process will be considered for forensically ready DIMSs. 
3.1 Classifying DI parameters by considering contexts of usage 
This section provides a list of DI parameters by considering contexts of usage of DIMS 
and the role of DI information as digital evidence in DFI. 
Obviously when talking about DFI process and DFIM phases and trying to build a 
forensically ready system, the context of usage is an important issue that affects federated 
DIMS architecture, security, and privacy properties. Therefore, to build a proper list of 
DI parameters by considering their role in DFI, challenges of usage contexts should be 
taken into account (i.e. the type and environment of web applications) to evaluate our DI 
parameters and try to develop and use a forensically ready DIMS. For example in the 
second phase of our DFIM, which is the deployment phase, it seems that DI parameters 
which help us detect a crime in an optimised way and in a low-cost online hospital IS 
system, such as online and offline data acquisition and traffic capturing, parameters of 
staff knowledge and expertise, should be placed at the top of our list of DI parameters. DI 
parameters in DIMS by considering contexts of usage and DI role as digital evidence in 
DFI process will be presented in the next section. 
After this, a list of parameters that should be considered to make forensically ready 
DIMS will be evaluated. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Forensically ready digital identity management systems 17    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
4 Evaluating DI parameters 
4.1 Evaluating DI lifecycle parameters 
This section attempts to evaluate the proposed DI lifecycle parameters in DIMS, which 
we had identified in Section 3. For this purpose, five experts including assistant 
professors at a cyberspace institute, independent IT and ICT experts to the Court 
and IT managers were requested to give their opinions via online questionnaires 
(http://www.network-forensic.net/form/PID01-09). DI lifecycle parameters using the 
AHP evaluation method, which has been prioritised in this paper, can be found in 
Table 10. Moreover, the weight of each DI lifecycle parameter has been presented in 
Figure 1. 
Table 10 AHP evaluation outcome of DI lifecycle parameters in DIMS forensic ready 
Ranking DI lifecycle parameters 
1 Minimal disclosure for a constrained use 
2 Directed identity 
3 Justifiable parties 
4 Users follow the paths with least resistance 
5 User control and consent 
6 Consistent experience across contexts 
7 Giving a consistence user experience 
8 Continues trust and risk assessment 
9 Pluralism of operators and technologies 
10 Usability 
11 Cognitive scalability 
12 Human integration 
13 Relying parties want to control customer experience 
14 Mutual authentication, not just user authentication 
4.2 Evaluating DI contexts of usage parameters 
This section tries to evaluate the proposed DI contexts of usage parameters in DIMS, 
which we identified in Section 4. For this purpose, five experts including assistant 
professors at a cyberspace institute, independent IT and ICT expert engineers to the Court 
and IT managers were requested to give their opinion via online questionnaires 
(http://www.network-forensic.net/form2/PID02-04). Prioritised DI contexts of usage 
parameters using the AHP evaluation method can be found in Table 11. Besides, the 
weight of each DI context of usage parameter has been presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 1 DI lifecycle parameters in forensically ready DIMS (see online version for colours) 
 
Table 11 AHP evaluation outcome of DI contexts of usage parameters in DIMS forensic ready 
Ranking DI contexts of usage parameters 
1 Level of staffs knowledge and expertise 
2 Make system more secure 
3 Mitigate risks 
4 Type of DIMS 
5 Comply with relevant laws and regulations 
6 On-line or off-line data acquisition and traffic capturing 
7 Efficiency goals 
8 Policies and regulations in organisational IS processes 
9 Lower overall (costs) 
10 Defined access levels to information and resources 
11 Data backup/restore mechanism and procedures 
12 Minimise liabilities 
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Figure 2 DI contexts of usage parameters in dims forensic ready (see online version for colours) 
 
5 Disscussions and conclusions 
The growing-use of cyberspace applications and the increasing number of online 
services have resulted in a sharp increase in the occurrence of cyber-attacks attacks and 
computer-related crimes. This increase in the incidence of cyber-crimes necessitates new 
solutions and tools to deal with these crimes. Digital crime investigations are based on 
digital evidence gathered from the crime scene. Crime scenes in digital crime 
investigation are the cyber space and computer networks. 
This paper proposed a new set of evaluation and design criteria for future DIMS that 
is forensically ready based on existing criteria and relevant literature about the identity 
management application areas in digital forensic investigation. 
Our evaluation revealed that while the criteria already give promising results, this 
could be improved by creating a more fine-grained set of parameters under each current 
criterion, thereby enabling more detailed results for forensically ready DIMS and 
improving DIMS development for a complete DFI process. 
The evaluation revealed some issues related to current DIMSs. These issues were the 
DI lifecycle parameters such as minimal disclosure for a constrained use, directed 
identity, justifiable parties, users’ following the paths with least resistance, and user 
control and consent. These most important DI lifecycle parameters show that in cases of 
DF and DFIP which are related to users’ security, privacy, and legal aspects in cyber 
space applications, minimum personal information for known purpose and usage are the 
most important parameters. Also this list can be used as a reference for professional and 
experienced IT users, indicating concerns and challenges regarding digital identity in the 
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development of DIMS. The DI context of usage parameters such as staff knowledge and 
expertise, making systems more secure, risks mitigation, type of DIMS, and compliance 
with relevant laws and regulations also supports the forensic readiness of DIMS. These 
parameters reveal the necessity and effectiveness of providing to the staff proper and 
adequate information about DFI and the relevant laws and regulations governing DIMS. 
Moreover, they will help to successfully develop and use forensically ready DIMS and 
reduce DFIP risks. 
These parameters seem to stem from the importance of designing identity 
management systems to function in secure and private manner and as a forensically ready 
system in DFIM. 
6 Further study 
Future work needed in this area to further elaborate the evaluation criteria and provide a 
more extensive evaluation of the existing identity systems as a digital forensically ready 
system. In order to improve on the proposed parameters to cover all aspects of 
cyberspace applications and their DIMSs, it is necessary to consider and evaluate 
parameters that are related to various types of networks and communication 
environments, along with the security level of information and the required type of access 
control in our IS. 
The evaluation of the current systems should be applied to actual systems in DFIM, 
and the test parameters and groups should be used in the actual evaluation in order to 
produce more comprehensive and accurate results. 
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